4 Juillet 2020
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5 National authorities have implemented these global standards in their jurisdictions, but not in all countries or in full. The Basel III framework is very broad, with many different elements.These cases teach us important lessons on how far the post-crisis reforms have enhanced loss absorbency and bank resolvability, including imposing losses on private stakeholders. 7.The finalisation of the Basel III framework in December 1 last year is a landmark achievement for bank regulation, providing banks with certainty about the regulatory requirements applicable to them.For instance, a major domestic bank was nationalised in Russia.The biggest challenge here is to ensure that retaining the flexibility of extending funding in resolution does not come at the cost of reintroducing moral hazard.You have already covered a lot of ground over the past three days, so let me be brief and offer some final thoughts.In the successful resolution of a mid-sized Spanish bank, for example, some bail-in was included; but the strongest success factor was probably the existence of a credible buyer.This year's conference is very timely, as it follows the resolution of a few banks in the post-crisis regulatory environment.Concluding remarks by Mr Agustin Carstens, General Manager of the BIS, at the 8th FSI-IADI conference on "Bank resolution, crisis management and deposit insurance", Basel, 2 February 2018. These cases teach us important lessons on how far the post-crisis reforms have enhanced loss absorbency and bank resolvability, including imposing losses on private stakeholders. They also show what remains to be done6t6t.131.521
30 Losses are not automatically passed up if the global parent holds the trigger for conversion, because it may simply decide to walk away rather than absorb the losses.Despite the ongoing policy debate (see, in particular, Tucker 2014a, b ), almost no formal economic analysis of the trade-offs between MPOE and SPOE resolution exists. Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism., and Guzman A.2.The model features two types of players: (1) a multinational financial institution that operates in two jurisdictions and (2) two national regulators with resolution authority in their respective jurisdictions.The constrained optimal model lies somewhere in between: It reduces cross-jurisdictional transfers to an amount that just satisfies the ex post IC constraint (i. Liquidity requirements, liquidity choice and financial stability. The resolvability challenge for banks.
Moreover, the very large financial firms that are the most likely subjects of a Title II proceeding have extensive cross-border activities, and thus implicate the legal systems of other countries.This fact only strengthens the case for measures to limit the potential of short-term wholesale funding to be an accelerant of systemic problems.Additional measures such as those I have suggested today will continue to enhance this third option of orderly resolution, and relieve government officials of the Hobson's choice of bailout or disruptive bankruptcy for systemically important financial firms.As I mentioned, serious work is being done by various commentators on proposals to adapt the Bankruptcy Code to the salient differences between financial and most other industries. firm may have contractual rights and substantial economic incentives to terminate their transactions as soon as the U.This guidance was informed by the cross-firm comparative review of the first round of resolution plans and reflected initial supervisory judgments of those practices and capabilities necessary to support effective recovery and resolution planning efforts.
Observing the five-year anniversaries of various key moments in the financial crisis throughout 2013 cannot but prompt us to step back and evaluate the
Abstract. We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared acros